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Abstract We consider the problem of reaching agreement
in distributed systems in which some processes may deviate
from their prescribed behavior before they eventually crash.
We call this failure model “mortal Byzantine”.
After discussing some application examples where this
model is justified, we provide matching upper and lower
bounds on the number of faulty processes, and on the re-
quired number of rounds in synchronous systems.
We then continue our study by varying different sys-
tem parameters. On the one hand, we consider the failure
model under weaker timing assumptions, namely for par-
tially synchronous systems and asynchronous systems with
unreliable failure detectors. On the other hand, we vary the
failure model in that we limit the occurrences of faulty steps
that actually lead to a crash in synchronous systems.
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1 Introduction
In a distributed system subject to failures, consensus is the
problem of agreeing on a common value out of a set of pro-
posed values. Since consensus is fundamental for building
reliable distributed systems, it has been considered under
many different failure assumptions. One of the most stud-
ied models are crash faults; see [15,20,39] for an overview.
However, the applicability of positive results that are related
to crashes is limited as crash faults capture only a small
number of causes that lead to abnormal behavior, such as
power outage or permanent disconnection of a node from
the network. A more general process failure model is the
Byzantine one, which does not postulate any assumption on
the behavior of faulty processes [38]. It captures all causes of
failure, ranging from arbitrary bit flips in memory to inten-
tional (malicious) causes like intrusions. However, Byzan-
tine behavior may be overly pessimistic if we consider non-
intentional faults, while the required redundancy — less than
a third of the processes may be faulty for consensus — may
be too expensive for many applications.
Additionally, the classic Byzantine assumption may be
too pessimistic in many practical systems where one finds
modules that observe the behavior of components and may
act on these components — either automatically or by oper-
ator decision — in case of anomaly. This results in a modifi-
cation of the component failure mode as perceived by other
components of the system. In such cases, a component may
not fail once and for ever according to a single “static” fail-
ure mode, but its faulty behavior follows some trajectory in
the set of possible failure modes.
2 Josef Widder et al.
In this paper we show that rather than considering the
worst case single failure mode exhibited by a component, it
can be fruitful to exploit some characteristics of its failure
mode trajectory. In particular, we consider failures which
eventually end as a crash, after some latency period where a
more pessimistic mode (up to arbitrary behavior) may be ex-
hibited. We call this behavior mortal Byzantine. Nesterenko
and Arora have introduced this kind of behavior in the con-
text of self-stabilizing dining philosophers [43] under the
name “malicious crashes”.
After some motivation examples in Sect. 2, and general
definitions in Sect. 3, we give our technical contribution.
The technical part of our paper is divided into three sec-
tions. In Sect. 4, we show that in synchronous systems, con-
sensus can be solved with less processes than in the classic
Byzantine case [31]: Our algorithm only requires a majority
of correct processes. We also show that a majority is nec-
essary, i.e., our algorithm is optimal with respect to the re-
quired number of processes. If t is the upper bound on the
number of crashes during an execution, it is also known that
consensus requires t + 1 rounds [30]. We show that in the
mortal Byzantine case, with just a majority of correct pro-
cesses, such a bound cannot exist, i.e., no algorithm decides
in a bounded number of rounds in every execution. More
precisely, we show that in the case of just a majority of cor-
rect processes there are executions where processes cannot
decide before faulty processes have crashed. So we make ex-
plicit that there is a trade-off between system size and live-
ness guarantees in the case of consensus.
From the case of mortal Byzantine faults in synchronous
systems, several generalizations are possible. The two ap-
proaches we discuss in the present paper are, on the one
hand, weakening the timing assumptions, and on the other
hand, parameterizing the failure model.
In Sect. 5, we shall therefore relax the timing assump-
tion. One classic way to solve consensus under relaxed tim-
ing behavior is partial synchrony [27]. In Sect. 5.1, we give a
lower bound for partially synchronous systems which shows
that it is not possible to solve consensus if a third of the pro-
cesses are faulty. For a matching upper bound, we observe
that Dwork, Lynch, and Stockmeyer [27] provided a par-
tially synchronous algorithm solving consensus if less than
a third of the processes are Byzantine faulty. As the mortal
Byzantine fault model restricts the behavior of faulty pro-
cesses more than the (classic) Byzantine fault model, this
algorithm also works in our case, and provides the matching
upper bound. We thus show that in partially synchronous
systems nothing can be gained with respect to redundancy
if the failure model is restricted from Byzantine to mortal
Byzantine.
Another way to solve consensus with more relaxed tim-
ing assumptions is the failure detector approach by Chandra
and Toueg [13]. With this approach, executions are consid-
ered to be asynchronous, but processes have access to or-
acles that provide information about the liveness of other
processes. For classic Byzantine failures, Doudou et al. [25,
26] showed, among other things, that consensus is impossi-
ble with classic unreliable failure detectors. (We will discuss
their and related approaches to circumvent this more thor-
oughly in Sect. 7.) For the mortal Byzantine model, we will
(in Sect. 5.2) present and prove correct a consensus algo-
rithm based on ideas from [27] and [13]; it requires that less
than a third of the processes are faulty. This algorithm is to-
tally asynchronous, which contrasts the literature on failure
detector based Byzantine consensus.
The mortal Byzantine model, as described above, im-
plies that if a process commits just one fault (e.g., sends a
message with bad content) it crashes eventually. In the con-
text of long-lived applications where the failure model is en-
forced by monitoring systems, eliminating a process due to
one mishap seems to be wasteful. We address this issue by
refining the failure model in the third major section, Sect. 6.
More specifically, we do not require that every fault commit-
ted by a process inevitably leads to a crash. Rather, we count
such mishaps and consider them just “potentially lethal.”
Only when they occur “too often” they are actually lethal
and lead to a crash.
In more detail, we consider variations along two lines.
On the one hand, we distinguish what kind of faulty behavior
is actually potentially lethal, that is, whether all faults may
lead to eventual crash or just faults that are perceived as two-
faced behavior of the process. On the other hand, we distin-
guish under what circumstances potentially lethal faults ac-
tually lead to crashes: we distinguish when these faults sum
up towards some threshold during either the whole execu-
tion, or just during a time window bounded in length.
Although these refined failure models are in the same
spirit as the mortal Byzantine fault model from the earlier
sections, they describe different fault behaviors, for instance,
they need not crash if they do not commit too many fail-
ures. Hence, most of them are not comparable to the mortal
Byzantine assumption.
In the case of all faults being potentially lethal, we show
that resilience can be improved compared to mortal Byzan-
tine faults. If only two-faced behavior is potentially lethal,
we shall explain that a majority of correct processes is suffi-
cient for consensus. Hence, such models are relevant in ap-
plications where one is willing to trade stronger assumptions
on failure behavior against reduced system size, such as for
instance applications with stringent weight limitation as in
the space industry.
Apart from the two generalizations we consider in this
paper, other approaches may of course also lead to inter-
esting results in this area. Notably, Bazzi and Herlihy [8]
have generalized our previous results to hybrid failure mod-
els, that is, for synchronous systems where mortal Byzantine
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faults as well as classic Byzantine faults may be present. In
addition to consensus, they also studied broadcast, for which
they showed that it is solvable for any number of faulty pro-
cesses. We will review their results in Sect. 7 along with
other related work.
2 Motivation
Often, space systems have to meet strong requirements in
terms of lifetime (without the possibility of repairing or re-
placing faulty components with new ones) and in terms of
mass and volume — limiting the number of available redun-
dant units. Space systems are also characterized for some
missions by a strong prevalence of temporary faults; e.g.,
due to radiation. Therefore, when a faulty behavior is ob-
served, it is usual practice to wait some time and assess
more precisely its actual impact and recurrence character-
istics, before (or instead of) engaging strong reconfiguration
and definitely losing the failed component. In this example,
the other components of the system may observe a faulty be-
havior evolving from maybe fully arbitrary to either correct
or crash.
Note that the duration of this process may vary from
very short to very long times. On the one hand, short du-
rations occur when an automatic on-board mechanism —
e.g., employing execution monitoring, temperature monitor-
ing, or power monitoring — can identify a high severity fail-
ure at the first manifestation and switch off the component.
While, on the other hand, long durations may be encoun-
tered when ground operators are in the loop to analyze trends
in the telemetry, before requesting some reconfiguration by
tele-commands. Between these two extremes, almost any
possible intermediate durations are possible. For instance,
it is common practice that an on-board mechanism explic-
itly counts the number of errors produced by a component
in successive computation cycles. When a given threshold
is reached — and the fault is considered permanent — the
component is then eventually shut down by this on-board
mechanism.
The European Automated Transfer Vehicle (ATV) is the
unmanned transport spacecraft which is launched towards
the manned International Space Station ISS. The ATV com-
puter architecture contains, among other elements, a pool
of computing units with distributed voting and agreement
mechanisms at pool level. In addition, each computing unit
of the pool is provided with a set of self-checking mecha-
nisms (whose main aim is to provide some detection cover-
age for common mode faults). A computing unit detected
as faulty by these self-checking mechanisms is reset into
a silent mode, and in particular does not participate in the
following votes. As a result of the combination of the vote
and agreement mechanisms at computer pool level and of
the self-checking mechanisms at the level of each computer
unit of the pool, it may happen that a computing unit — as
seen from other units — first appears faulty according to an
arbitrary failure mode, before appearing crashed.
Applying the separation of concerns principle [21], con-
sensus should work independently of the monitoring mech-
anism (or the human intervention). Consequently, solutions
to consensus should rest on an abstract definition of the fault
models that have to be tolerated, and this definition should
be given independently of the machinery that enforces it.
In the examples discussed above, an abstract description of
the behavior of faulty processes leads directly to the mortal
Byzantine failure model discussed in this paper.
3 General model and problem statement
Let Π be a finite set of processes which constitute the dis-
tributed system with |Π | = n. A distributed algorithm A is
a set of deterministic automata (Ap)p∈Π . An execution is an
infinite sequence of steps ofA . In each execution, each cor-
rect process p takes an infinite number of steps according
to Ap. Processes communicate by message passing.
We make the following assumptions for mortal Byzan-
tine faults: A process is faulty in an execution if it only takes
a finite number of steps in this execution. If p is faulty, its
behavior may deviate from its prescribed behavior Ap, but
p may send at most a finite number of messages. In every
execution, at most t processes are faulty.
In the following sections we will consider diverse kinds
of models which have additional assumptions. These will
be stated in the respective sections. Throughout the paper
we will, however, always consider the same variant of the
consensus problem. Every correct process has some initial
value v ∈ {0,1} represented in its initial state. All states of
a correct process p can be partitioned into the three sets in
which p has not yet decided, p has decided 0, and p has
decided 1. If during an execution a correct process p is in a
state where it has decided w, we require that in the remainder
of the execution, p is only in states in which it has decided w,
that is, each decision is irrevocable. Within the states there
are halting states which ensure that after a correct process p
has reached a halting state s, each step of p according to Ap
results in p being in s and no message is sent by p during this
step. We say that p halts if it reaches a halting state. More-
over, each solution to the consensus problem must fulfill the
following requirements:
Agreement. No two correct processes decide differently.
Validity. If some correct process decides v, then v is the ini-
tial value of some correct process.
Decision. Every correct process eventually decides.
Halting. Every correct process eventually halts.
As we consider binary consensus, our validity condition
is equivalent to “if all correct processes propose v, and a cor-
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rect process decides w, then v = w.” Discussions on multi-
valued consensus are given in Section 8.
4 Synchronous systems
In this section we consider the synchronous model of dis-
tributed computation in which the steps of correct processes
are organized in rounds. During each round, a correct pro-
cess sends a message to each process for the current round
according to its state, receives messages, and executes a state
transition according to its state, the received messages, and
its algorithm. A message sent by correct process p to correct
process q in round r is received by q in round r.
In the following analysis, we will denote by f rq the con-
tent of correct process q’s local variable f (represented in
the state of q) at the end of round r. As part of a message,
we denote by “∗ ” an open value.
We will present and analyze our algorithm that solves
consensus in the presence of up to t < n/2 faulty processes
in Sect. 4.1. In Sect. 4.2, we will then show that it is optimal.
4.1 Algorithm
In the classic lower bound proofs [38,39] for consensus
in the presence of Byzantine processes one argues, infor-
mally speaking, that for every algorithm that should solve
consensus, if there are at least a third of the processes faulty,
then there are situations in certain executions where a correct
process p “knows” that some other process is faulty, but p
cannot decide which one. The main idea of our algorithm is
that if p encounters such a case, it waits until the faulty pro-
cesses crash and the faulty values received can be removed.
So this dilemma can be overcome due to the different failure
assumption.
In more detail, our Algorithm 1 operates in phases con-
sisting of two consecutive rounds. In the first round of each
phase, correct processes send their proposed value and their
decision value (⊥ until processes decide) to all. Every cor-
rect process p collects these in the vectors rcvpropp and
rcvdecp. Moreover, p checks whether some process q’s mes-
sage was missing in some round. If this is the case, q is re-
moved from p’s estimate of the set of alive processes pip, and
the number fp of possibly alive faulty processes is updated.
Entries in vectors rcvdecp or rcvpropp which correspond to
faulty processes are set to † or ⊥, respectively.
In the second round of a phase, p sends rcvpropp and
rcvdecp to all. At the end of the second round, p checks
whether all vectors it received from processes in pip — that
is, processes that are not considered faulty — are equal. In
this case p tries to decide: it may decide on a value w if it
has received at least fp +1 messages stating that the sender
proposed w. Recall that fp is not constant (as t ≥ fp is the
bound on the number of faults) as when a process has been
detected as being faulty (if no message was received from
this process in some round), fp is decreased by 1. Addition-
ally, p may only decide w if it (or any other process in pip,
cf. rcvdecp) did not receive a message in the previous round
sent by some still alive process q stating that q has decided
1−w. Therefore if a faulty (but still alive) process sends that
it decided w and another process sends it decided 1−w, it
is impossible to decide in this phase. However, since faulty
processes eventually crash, their decision is removed (i.e.,
overwritten with †) and will not be considered anymore;
thereby, taking a decision becomes possible again.
At the end of the second round, correct process p halts if
all processes are either detected as faulty (rcvdecp[i] = †) or
are known to have decided (rcvdecp[i] ∈ {0,1}). Otherwise,
a new phase is started.
In the remainder of this section we prove that our algo-
rithm solves consensus by separately proving the required
properties. We commence with preliminary definitions, that
capture the round D in which the last process decides and
the round H the first process halts in. To avoid circularity in
the proofs we define D and H to be infinity for executions
where such rounds do not exist, that is any property that we
show to hold until one of these rounds will hold forever. We
show only later in Theorems 3 and 4 that in each execution
D and H are in fact finite.
Definition 1 (Last Decision) We define D as the round in
an execution for which it holds that all correct processes
have decided by round D, and at least one correct process
has not decided in round D− 1. Further, d is one such cor-
rect process.
Definition 2 (First Halt) We define H as the maximum
round in an execution for which it holds that no correct pro-
cess has halted in some round less than H in this execution.
We start our analysis with some preliminary lemmas.
First, we make some statements about the decision value
decisionp which are quite obvious from code inspection:
Lemma 1 (Decision) If p is a correct process, then the fol-
lowing statements hold:
(1) decision0p =⊥.
(2) If decisionp is updated to value v, then v ∈ {0,1}.
(3) Variable decisionp is changed at most once.
Proof Statement (1) follows from the fact that decisionp is
initialized to ⊥ in line 5. For statement (2), we note that in
line 41, decisionp gets assigned the minimum value in W .
Inspection of line 38 reveals that only the values 0 and 1
can be in the set W . Statement (3) is a consequence of (2),
since the if-condition in line 37, which encloses the only as-
signment to decisionp, can only evaluate to true as long as
decisionp = ⊥. So once line 41 has been executed, the if-
condition will evaluate to false in all subsequent rounds. uunionsq
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Algorithm 1 Synchronous, Mortal Byzantine Tolerant Consensus
Code for processes p if they are correct:
Variables
1: rp← 0 // round number
2: pip←Π // the set of processes that are not detected faulty by p
3: fp← t // possible number of not yet detected faulty processes
4: propp ∈ {0,1} // proposed value
5: decisionp ∈ {0,1,⊥}←⊥ // initially ⊥
6: rcvpropp[n] ∈ {0,1,⊥} // proposed value received from i in the current round
7: rcvdecp[n] ∈ {0,1,⊥,†} // decision value received from i in the current round
8: c propp[n][n] ∈ {0,1,⊥} // the proposed values as seen by other processes
9: c pip[n] // the set of alive processes as seen by other processes
10: c decp[n][n] ∈ {0,1,⊥,†} // the decided values as seen by other processes
11: repeat
12: if rp(mod)2 = 0 then
13: send (INFORM, propp, decisionp) to all
14: receive
15: for all i ∈Π do
16: if no message from i was received in some round then
17: rcvdecp[i]← † // i is faulty
18: rcvpropp[i]←⊥
19: pip← pip \{i}
20: fp← t−|Π −pip|
21: else
22: if received (INFORM, propi, decisioni) from i in current round then
23: rcvpropp[i]← propi
24: rcvdecp[i]← decisioni
25: if rp(mod)2 = 1 then
26: send (ECHO, rcvpropp, pip, rcvdecp) to all
27: receive
28: for all i ∈Π do
29: if received (ECHO, rcvpropi, pii, rcvdeci) from i then
30: c propp[i]← rcvpropi
31: c pip[i]← pii
32: c decp[i]← rcvdeci
33: else
34: c propp[i]←⊥ // i is faulty
35: c pip[i]←⊥
36: c decp[i]←⊥
37: if decisionp =⊥∧∀i, j ∈ pip:c propp[i] = c propp[ j]∧ c pip[i] = c pip[ j]∧ c decp[i] = c decp[ j] then
38: W ←{w:w ∈ {0,1}∧ |{ j ∈ pip:rcvpropp[ j] = w}| ≥ fp +1∧∀i ∈Π :rcvdecp[i] 6= (1−w)}
39: if |W |> 0 then
40: decide minW
41: decisionp←minW
42: rp← rp +1
43: until ∀i ∈Π :rcvdecp[i] 6=⊥
44: halt
Now, we consider how a correct process is perceived by
another correct process p via the variables rcvdecp and pip.
Lemma 2 (Perception of Decisions) If p and q both are
correct processes, then the following statements hold:
(1) If decisionrq =⊥, then rcvdecsp[q] =⊥ in all rounds s ≤
r+1.
(2) if D is finite then D< H.
(3) If q takes the decision v in round r, then rcvdecsp[q] = v
in all rounds s with r < s≤ D+1.
(4) If a message from process i does not arrive at p in round
r<H, then rcvdecsp[i] = † and i 6∈ pisp in all rounds s> r.
Proof The variable rcvdecp is modified at two places in the
code, in line 17 and in line 24. Note that in any round r with
r(mod)2 = 0, either line 17 or line 24 is executed at each
correct process for each process.
As q is correct, p will receive a message from q in ev-
ery round r until q halts, which cannot happen as long as
decisionrq = ⊥. Thus, we can limit ourselves to considering
line 24, where p takes over the value received from q and
q sends decisionrq in line 13, it follows that rcvdec
s
p[q] = ⊥
in all rounds s ≤ r. To prove (1), it thus remains to show
that this also holds for s = r+1. To see this, consider that q
can only assign a new value to decisionq in rounds r where
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r(mod)2 = 1 (line 41), but decisionq is only sent (and re-
ceived by p) in rounds r with r(mod)2= 0. In other words a
change in decisionq can only propagate to p one round later.
To show (2), we observe that correct process p only halts
if there is no⊥ in the rcvdecp array, see line 43. Since we get
from (1) that rcvdecrp[d] =⊥ in all rounds r ≤ D, it follows
that no correct process halts before round H ≥ D+1.
For (3), we again observe that if q has made decision
decisionq = v in round r (line 41), then this decision is sent
to all in round r+1 (line 13) and taken over into rcvdecp[q]
in that same round (line 24). From Lemma 1 (3) we know
that once a correct process decides, it sticks to that decision.
We also know from (2) that no correct process halts before
round D+ 1 such that it sends messages in all rounds until
D+ 1 such that line 17 is not executed by a correct process
before round D. Consequently, rcvdecsp[q] = v for all rounds
s, r < s≤ D+1.
Statement (4) is concerned with faulty processes. If r is
even, then the if-condition in line 16 will evaluate to true
and hence rcvdecrp[i] will be set to † in line 17 and i will be
removed from pip in line 19. If r is an odd round, then in
round r+ 1 the if-condition in line 16 will evaluate to true
and rcvdecr+1p [i] = † will be assigned in line 17 and i will
be removed from pip in line 19. Since once the if-condition
evaluates to true for process i it does so for the remainder of
the execution, we have rcvdecsp[i] = † for all rounds s > r.
Also note that no process is ever added to pip, thus that part
of the statement follows as well. uunionsq
Lemma 3 (Failure Detection) If p and q both are correct
processes, then the following statements hold:
(1) q ∈ pirp in all rounds r ≤ D.
(2) |pirp|> t in all rounds r ≤ D.
(3) For each round r ≤ D no more than f rp faulty processes
are in pirp.
(4) If process i crashes before round r, then i 6∈ pisp in all
rounds s> r.
Proof To prove (1), we note that a process i is only removed
from pip if p did not receive a message from i in some round
(line 16 and line 19). By Lemma 2 (2), q does not halt before
round D and by simple code inspection we find that q sends a
message in every round until it halts in round H >D or later.
Consequently, messages from q must arrive in each round at
least until H, and thus q ∈ pirp for all rounds r ≤ D.
(2) follows from (1), since in all rounds r≤D all correct
processes are in pirp of every correct process p. By assump-
tion, |Π | ≥ 2t+1. Therefore, |pirp|> t.
To show (3), we note that initially pip = Π and fp = t
such that our statement holds by the assumed bound on the
number of (faulty) processes. By simple code inspection no
process is ever added to pip. If a process is removed from pip,
this is done in line 19 and fp is set to t−|Π −pip| in line 20.
Since by (1), up to round D no correct — i.e., only faulty —
processes are removed from pip, there cannot be more than
f rp faulty processes remaining in pirp.
Statement (4) follows directly from Lemma 2 (4). uunionsq
Equipped with these basic facts, we can now start to con-
sider the consensus properties of the algorithm.
Theorem 1 (Validity) If a correct process decides on some
value v, then v was proposed by a correct process.
Proof By line 38, correct process p only decides in some
round r on a value v that was received by at least f rp + 1
(INFORM, v, ∗ ) messages from distinct processes in pirp in
round r− 1. By Lemma 3 (3), there are no more than f rp
faulty processes in pirp such that at least 1 correct process
must have proposed v. uunionsq
After validity, we now turn our attention towards agree-
ment, for which we employ the following lemma.
Lemma 4 If two correct processes p and q both decide in
some round r, then both decide on the same value v.
Proof By line 38 and line 40, the decision value is a de-
terministic function (identical at all correct processes) of
rcvproprs, pirs , f rs , and rcvdecrs for correct process s ∈ {p,q}.
We thus have to show that these four variables must have
identical values at correct processes p and q in some round r
in which both decide.
From Lemma 3 (1) it follows that q ∈ pirp and p ∈ pirq for
r ≤ D. Since both decide in line 40 in round r, line 37 must
have evaluated to TRUE in this round at both processes. It
follows that rcvproprp = rcvprop
r
q, rcvdec
r
p = rcvdec
r
q, pirp =
pirq, and thus f rp = f rq by line 20. From the deterministic de-
cision function, our lemma follows. uunionsq
Theorem 2 (Agreement) No two correct processes decide
differently.
Proof By Lemma 4, two correct processes do not decide dif-
ferently if they decide in the same round. It remains to show
that a correct process q does not decide on a different value
from the value another correct process p has decided in some
earlier round.
Assume by contradiction that a correct process p decides
on w ∈ {0,1} in round r and some other correct process q
decides 1−w in some round s> r. By line 38, for all i in Π ,
rcvdecsq[i] 6= w, but by Lemma 2 (3), rcvdecsq[p] = w, which
provides the required contradiction. uunionsq
As seen above, agreement and validity can be proven
independently of the rounds processes crash in. Unfortu-
nately, this is not true for liveness. However, as we will see
in Sect. 4.2 this is inherent to solving consensus in the pres-
ence of t mortal Byzantine processes, when n ≤ 3t. In our
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analysis we hence have to use the round in an execution at
which the last faulty process crashes in order to show de-
cision (and halting) of our algorithm. More precisely, we
prove that if all faulty processes have crashed and their mes-
sages are received, the system is in a “clean” state such that
the consistency checks in line 37 and line 38 allow every cor-
rect process to reach a decision.
Definition 3 (Last Crash) We define C as the minimum
round such that all processes that crash in an execution are
crashed by (i.e., before or in) round C and all messages sent
by faulty processes are received by round C.
From our system models it follows that in every execu-
tion a finite C exists. All rounds r >C are clean rounds, i.e.,
no messages by faulty processes are received in rounds r.
Theorem 3 (Decision) Every correct process eventually
decides.
Proof Let r be the minimal round for which it holds that
r>C and r(mod)2= 0. If all correct processes decide before
round r we are done. So in the remainder of this proof we
consider only the case where at least one correct process p
does not decide before round r.
In the following we will show that every correct process
that does not decide before round r decides at the end of
round r+1 by executing line 40. A correct process executes
line 40 only if the statement in line 37 evaluates to TRUE and
if |W | > 0, where W is computed in line 38. In Lemma 6,
Lemma 7, and Lemma 8, we will show that these two re-
quirements are met.
Lemma 5 For any two correct processes p and q it holds
that rcvdecr+1p = rcvdec
r+1
q , pir+1p = pir+1q , f r+1p = f r+1q , and
rcvpropr+1p = rcvprop
r+1
q .
Proof By Lemma 2 (4) correct processes consistently de-
tect all faulty processes and set the corresponding entries
in rcvdecp. By Lemma 2 (1) and (3), all correct processes
set the entries corresponding to correct processes in rcvdecp
identically. Thus, there is agreement on the vectors rcvdecp
at all correct processes p at the end of round r (and thus at
the beginning of round r+1). Similarly, by Lemma 3 (1) and
(4), pir+1p and f r+1p are identical at all correct processes p. In
round r, all correct processes also send their proposed val-
ues to all, which are received by all correct processes p who
therefore set rcvpropp consistently. uunionsq
Lemma 6 For every correct process that does not decide
before round r, it holds that line 37 evaluates to TRUE in
round r+1.
Proof In round r+ 1, all correct processes p send (ECHO,
rcvpropr+1p , pir+1p , rcvdecr+1p ) to all. Since by Lemma 5 all
rcvpropr+1p , rcvdec
r+1
p , pir+1p , and thus f r+1p are identical,
line 37 evaluates to TRUE at every correct process that does
not decide before round r. uunionsq
So far, we have shown that every correct process p that
does not decide before round r reaches line 38 in round r+1.
In the following, we have to show that after executing line 38
in round r+ 1 it holds that |W | > 0 at every p such that p
decides. To this end, we distinguish two cases: We consider
in Lemma 7 the case where at least one correct process de-
cides in a round before r+1, and in Lemma 8 the other case,
where no process has decided before.
Lemma 7 If at least one correct process decides before
round r, then for every correct process p that does not de-
cide before round r, |W |> 0 in round r+1 .
Proof By Theorem 2, all correct processes i that already de-
cided in earlier rounds decided on the same value w, and
thus rcvdecr+1p [i] = w. By Lemma 3 (4), rcvdec
r+1
p [i] = † for
all faulty processes i. By Lemma 2 (1), for correct process i
that has not decided yet, rcvdecr+1p [i] = ⊥. It follows that
rcvdecr+1p [i] 6= 1−w for all processes i. In order to show
that |W | > 0, it remains to show that there are more than
f r+1p entries for w in rcvprop
r+1
p [i] for processes i ∈ pir+1p ,
i.e., correct processes i.
Assume process q has decided w in some earlier round s.
Due to line 38, it has received (INFORM, w, ∗ ) from ` > f sq
distinct processes in round s− 1. Out of these messages,
a≤ f sq are due to faulty senders and b = `−a are from cor-
rect processes. Note that b> f sq−a.
For correct process p in round r we know that it has re-
ceived b messages (INFORM, w, ∗ ) from distinct correct pro-
cesses (which have sent it via line 13). We also know that all
faulty processes are crashed before round r, which includes
those a faulty processes that helped q to reach its thresh-
old. If follows that f r+1p ≤ f sq − a < b and thus sufficiently
many (INFORM, w, ∗ ) messages were received. Thus, there
are more than f r+1p entries for w in rcvprop
r+1
p [i] for i∈ pir+1p
and thus by line 38, |W |> 0. uunionsq
Lemma 8 If no correct process decides before round r, then
for every correct process p, |W |> 0 in round r+1.
Proof For all faulty processes i, rcvdecr+1p [i] = †, and for all
correct process j, rcvdecr+1p [ j] = ⊥, by Lemma 3 (4) and
Lemma 2 (1), respectively. Thus, all entries in rcvdecr+1p
at correct process p are either ⊥ or †, such that |W | > 0,
if there exists at least one value w for which holds that
|{ j∈ pip:rcvpropp[ j] =w}|≥ f r+1p +1. According to line 20,
fp = t − |Π − pip| such that, since pip ⊆ Π , we get |pip| =
n− t + fp and by the assumption on the number of pro-
cesses (n− t > t) we get |pip|> t+ fp ≥ 2 fp. It follows from
Lemma 1 (2) that there are only two possible decision val-
ues such that it follows that at least one must be proposed by
more than f r+1p correct processes and thus |W |> 0. uunionsq
Lemma 6 implies that every correct process p that does
not decide before round r executes line 38 in round r+1. By
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Lemma 7 and Lemma 8, p executes line 38 in round r+ 1
so that |W | > 0 and consequently every p decides in round
r + 1. Thus, every correct process decides at the latest in
round r+1, and our Theorem 3 follows. uunionsq
Theorem 4 (Halting) Every correct process halts.
Proof We have to show that the expression of line 43 even-
tually evaluates to TRUE at every correct process p, i.e., that
eventually ∀i ∈Π :rcvdecp[i] 6=⊥.
By Theorem 3, all correct processes eventually decide.
After deciding — but before halting — they send their deci-
sion value via (INFORM, ∗ , decisionp) to all in every even
numbered round in line 13. The decisions are then written
into rcvdecp[i] in line 24 such that eventually for all correct
processes i, rcvdecp[i] 6=⊥ at every correct process p. (Note
that rcvdecp[i] is never reset to ⊥ for correct processes i if it
was set to some value once.)
The faulty processes eventually stop sending messages
such that missing messages will be detected at every correct
process, and in line 17, rcvdecp[i]← † will be set for every
faulty process i at every correct process p. Consequently, for
all processes i, eventually rcvdecp[i] 6= ⊥ at every correct
process p such that our lemma follows. uunionsq
Corollary 1 Algorithm 1 solves consensus.
4.2 Lower bounds
One property of our algorithm is that it is guaranteed to de-
cide only when all faulty processes have crashed. We show
that given the number of processes it is inherently impossi-
ble to bound the decision time. Our failure model restricts
the behavior more than the classic Byzantine model [38].
Thus, algorithms that solve consensus in the classic model
with n > 3t within t + 1 rounds [38] can be applied to our
model as well. In the following, we will show that when one
reduces n, it is not possible anymore to solve the problem in
a fixed number of rounds. We show that the round in which
the last correct process decides cannot be constant, but de-
pends on the failure pattern — a mapping of the set of faulty
processes to a set of integers representing the round number
in which the processes crash [23].
Theorem 5 In a system with up to t mortal Byzantine faults,
it holds for any integer c and for any deterministic algo-
rithm A that solves consensus for any n > 2t that there ex-
ists at least one execution ofA where the first faulty process
crashes in round c and at least one correct process decides
in some round r ≥ c.
Proof Consider by way of contradiction that a consensus al-
gorithmA exists where in every possible execution ofA in
which faults occur, all correct processes decide before the
first faulty process crashes. At the time the correct processes
decide, the prefixes of these executions can be mapped one-
to-one to identical prefixes of executions of A in the pres-
ence of classic Byzantine faults. Thus, A also solves con-
sensus with classic Byzantine faults contradicting the lower
bound by Lamport, Shostak, and Pease [38] of n> 3t. uunionsq
Corollary 2 There is no correct deterministic algorithm
that solves consensus in the presence of up to t ≥ n/3 mortal
Byzantine faults in a bounded number g(t) rounds, g being
an arbitrary function on the upper bound on the number of
faulty processes.
After considering the decision time, we now show that
our algorithm is optimal regarding the number of processes.
We show that no algorithm exists for 2t processes.
Theorem 6 There is no algorithm that solves consensus in
the presence of t mortal Byzantine faults if n = 2t.
Proof Consider by contradiction that such an algorithm A
exists. And further consider a fault free execution E of A
in which t correct processes propose 0 and t correct pro-
cesses propose 1. Let in this execution p be a correct process
that proposes w ∈ {0,1} and decides 1−w, and let it decide
in round r. Such a process p must exist as both values are
proposed by correct processes and only one can be decided
upon by the agreement property of consensus.
Now consider executions of A where p is correct and p
is one of t correct processes that propose w and the remain-
ing t faulty processes behave according to the algorithm at
least until round r but (wrongly) propose 1−w. There ex-
ists such an execution Et that is at least up to round r for
correct process p locally indistinguishable from E . Thus p
decides on 1−w in round r. After round r, all faulty pro-
cesses crash such that Et is an admissible execution in our
model. However,A violates validity in Et as p decides 1−w
although it was not proposed by any correct process in Et ,
which provides the required contradiction toA solving con-
sensus. uunionsq
5 Relaxed timing assumptions
5.1 Partially synchronous systems
In this section, we employ the basic round model introduced
in [27]. The model is a generalization of the synchronous
model relaxed with respect to reliability of communication.
It is assumed that if a correct process receives a message in
round r sent from a correct process, the message was sent
in round r, that is, the model is communication closed [28].
Further, it is assumed that in every execution there exists a
round GST (called, global stabilization time) such that for
all rounds r ≥ GST, a message sent by correct process p to
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correct process q in round r is received by q in round r. (As
a consequence of the definitions, messages sent before GST
may be lost.)
Our failure assumption restricts behavior of faulty pro-
cesses more than the classic Byzantine assumption. Con-
sequently, in partially synchronous systems the algorithms
from [27], that solve consensus for n≥ 3t+1, solve consen-
sus also for mortal Byzantine faults. Using a standard parti-
tioning argument, we show that this redundancy is optimal
for mortal Byzantine faults.
Theorem 7 There exists no algorithm that solves consen-
sus among n = 3t processes in the basic round model in the
presence of up to t mortal Byzantine faults.
Proof We consider a system of 3t processes and separate
the processes into three disjoint sets A, B, and C such that
|A|= |B|= |C|= t.
Consider by contradiction that an algorithm A exists
that solves consensus in this system.
Let EA be an execution of A where all processes in C
are initially crashed and GSTA = 0. Further let all correct
processes propose 1 such that there is some round DA in
which the last correct process p ∈ A decides 1.
Similarly, let EC be an execution of A where all pro-
cesses in A are initially crashed and GSTC = 0. Further let
all correct processes propose 0 such that there is some round
DC in which the last correct process q ∈C decides 0.
We now consider the executions of algorithm A where
GST > max{DC,DA}, all processes in A and C are correct,
and all processes in B are mortal Byzantine faulty and crash
only after round GST. We further restrict our analysis to
executions where processes within the sets A and C have
synchronous communication right from the beginning, but
communication between these two sets is asynchronous un-
til GST, i.e., no messages are received from processes in the
other set. Further, the faulty processes in B are perceived by
all processes in A∪C as if they would communicate syn-
chronously with them right from the start.
Now consider the execution E where all processes in A
propose 1 and all processes in C propose 0 and where in
each round up to GST the processes in A receive the same
messages from the processes in B as in EA and the processes
in C receive the same messages from the processes in B as
in EC. To A, E is indistinguishable from EA up to DA such
that they decide 1, while to the processes in C, E is indis-
tinguishable from EC such that they decide 0. This behavior
violates agreement and thus we have a contradiction to the
assumption that A solves consensus. uunionsq
5.2 Asynchronous system with failure detector
In this section we consider the asynchronous model of com-
putation augmented with unreliable failure detectors intro-
duced by Chandra and Toueg [13]. We provide here only the
details of the model to the extent necessary for our paper;
for a more detailed definition, cf. [13].
For the failure detector approach, we assume that there
is a discrete global time N. As in the crash case defined in
[13], we consider failure patterns as function F :N→ 2Π .
We only consider failure patterns where F(t)⊆ F(t+1) and
|⋃t∈NF(t)|< n/3.
If p 6∈ F(t) and p∈ F(t+1), we say process p crashes at
time t+1. A process that crashes is mortal Byzantine faulty
as defined in Sect. 3, i.e., it is allowed to behave arbitrarily
until it crashes, except that it may only send a finite number
of messages. A process that never crashes is correct.
Asynchronous computations are modeled as sequences
of steps that happen at certain times. During each step a cor-
rect process p
– delivers at most one message previously sent to p,
– queries its local failure detector and receives a response
which is defined with respect to the time the step occurs,
– performs a state transition according to its algorithm, the
received messages and the response from the failure de-
tector, and
– possibly sends a message.
The system is asynchronous in that we do not assume
any bounds on the time between the send step and the re-
ceive step of a message (message delays) or the time be-
tween two steps (computing speeds), except that all these
times have to be finite for correct processes. If some process
is in F(t), it does not take a step at time t.
We limit ourselves here to failure detectors which re-
spond with a set of process identifiers that are suspected of
having crashed. Using this convention one can define the
eventually perfect failure detector P as in [13] via the fol-
lowing properties:
Strong Completeness. There is a time from which onwards
every process that crashes is permanently suspected by
every correct process.
Eventual Strong Accuracy. There is a time after which no
process is suspected before it crashes.
Aguilera et al. [3] devised an algorithm that solves con-
sensus in the presence of Byzantine faults under weak syn-
chrony assumptions. In their solution, they used consistent
unique broadcast (based upon [10,46]). Similarly, we use
consistent unique broadcast to ensure that faulty processes
are not perceived two-faced by correct processes. To ease
the presentation of the algorithm, we assume that the sys-
tem is equipped with consistent unique broadcast [3] that
has cubcast and cudeliver as broadcast and delivery prim-
itives, respectively. Under these primitives, messages have
the form (p, TYPE, k, v) where
– p is the sender identifier,
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– TYPE is a message type identifier (e.g., ACK, NACK),
– k is a phase number, and
– v is a value.
As in the synchronous case, we denote by “∗ ” an open
value.
Definition 4 (Consistent Unique Broadcast) For consis-
tent unique broadcast the message system has to satisfy the
following properties:
Totality. If a correct process p invokes cubcast with mes-
sage (p, TYPE, k, v) then all correct processes eventually
invoke cudeliver for (p, TYPE, k, v).
Unforgeability. If some correct process p does not invoke
cubcast with message (p, TYPE, k, v) then no correct
processes ever invokes cudeliver for (p, TYPE, k, v).
Relay. If a correct process invokes cudeliver for message
(p, TYPE, k, v) then eventually all correct processes in-
voke cudeliver for (p, TYPE, k, v).
Uniqueness. For each p, TYPE, and k every correct process
invokes cudeliver at most once for (p, TYPE, k, ∗ ).
Implementations of this broadcasting primitive for asyn-
chronous systems even without failure detectors in the pres-
ence of up to t < n/3 (classic) Byzantine faults can be found
in [10,46]. Consequently, this primitive can also be imple-
mented in our setting.
5.2.1 The algorithm
Algorithm 2 is a variant of the classic Byzantine con-
sensus algorithm that Dwork, Lynch, and Stockmeyer have
introduced in their seminal paper on partial synchrony [27].
Moreover, the algorithm uses some mechanisms introduced
in the failure detector based (crash) consensus algorithm by
Chandra and Toueg [13].
We find it convenient to present the algorithm to con-
sist of two tasks. While the first task loops through phases
each consisting of four rounds, the second task performs
jobs which are independent of the round the first task is
currently executing. (For a complete implementation of the
algorithm, additional tasks for implementing the consistent
unique broadcast may be required.) We assume that these
tasks are scheduled fairly, e.g., in round robin.
The key idea is that in each phase a different process is
the coordinator. The coordinator tries to find a decision value
that is consistent with the validity requirement of consensus.
If such a value is found by a correct coordinator, it sends this
value via a DECIDE message. A locking mechanism ensures
that no correct process that becomes coordinator in a later
phase will find a different value to decide, which ensures
agreement. After the system becomes stable (all faulty pro-
cesses have crashed and the failure detector provides reliable
information) every correct coordinator will find a value and
send the DECIDE message. These messages are handled in
the second task, and eventually there are sufficiently many
of these messages in the system such that processes reach a
decision and halt. We now give a more detailed description
of the separate parts of the algorithm.
Each process p maintains two sets of values. The set
proposedp always keeps the value a correct process p is cer-
tain at least one correct process has initially proposed (re-
quired for validity). Initially, this set contains just the initial
value of the process itself. For the locking mechanism, the
second set called acceptablep is used. It contains only val-
ues from proposedp, and in case values are locked by p, it
contains only those locked by p.
During each phase the following happens: In Round 1,
all correct processes cubcast INFORM messages containing
their acceptable set. The processes wait for delivery of those
INFORM messages in Round 2 where the INFORM messages
are collected from all processes that are not suspected — i.e.,
the processes that are not in the failure detector output Dp.
Throughout the algorithm,Mp(v,φ) denotes the set of mes-
sages (q, INFORM, φ , acceptableq) delivered by process p
where v ∈ acceptableq (this set is maintained in the sepa-
rate Task 2). Note that due to false suspicions and the asyn-
chrony, INFORM messages broadcast in Round 1 of some
phase can be delivered in arbitrary rounds (belonging to ar-
bitrary phases). Only when the false suspicions stop occur-
ring and the last messages of all crashed processes are de-
livered — i.e., in the stable period — it is ensured that the
messages are delivered in the round they were broadcast.
In Round 2 the coordinator tries to lock some value. A
value can be locked if at least n− t processes find the value
acceptable. If it finds such a value it broadcasts a LOCK mes-
sage, instructing the other processes that they should set a
lock on this value. If the coordinator does not find such a
value it broadcasts “I DO NOT KNOW”.
In Round 3, each correct process waits for the cudeliver
of either a LOCK message or an I DO NOT KNOW message
from the coordinator, as long as the latter is not suspected
to have crashed. If a process receives a LOCK message, it
checks whether this message is acceptable for at least n− t
processes in the current phase. If so, it returns an acknowl-
edgment (ACK) to the coordinator, otherwise a negative ac-
knowledgment is sent. Basically, by sending the ACK mes-
sage, a correct process p tells the coordinator that it is going
to lock the value in the next round.
If a coordinator, during Round 4, receives sufficiently
many ACK messages, it is certain that sufficiently many cor-
rect processes lock the value in the current phase and that
therefore no other correct coordinator can find a different
value in a later phase. (That is, the current execution is uni-
valent [32].) Therefore, it sends a DECIDE message. The
DECIDE messages are used to propagate the decision and
for reaching a halting state eventually in Task 2 (see below).
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Algorithm 2 Mortal Byzantine Tolerant Consensus Algorithm
Code for processes p if they are correct:
Variables
1: lockp← 0
2: rp← 0
3: proposedp←{vp}
4: acceptablep← proposedp
Task 1
5: loop
6: rp← rp +1
7: φp← brp/4c
8: cp← (φp mod n)+1
9: if rp(mod)4 = 1 then
10: cubcast (p, INFORM, φp, acceptablep)
11: else if rp(mod)4 = 2 then
12: wait until cudeliver (q, INFORM, φp, acceptableq) from all processes q 6∈Dp
13: if p = cp then
14: Vp←{v: |Mp(v,φp)| ≥ n− t} // Coordinator tries to choose a value.
15: if Vp 6= /0 then
16: w←min{v:v ∈ Vp} // There is a value that can be chosen.
17: cubcast (p, LOCK, φp, w)
18: else
19: cubcast (p, I DO NOT KNOW, φp)
20: else if rp(mod)4 = 3 then
21: wait until cudeliver (cp, LOCK, φp, w) or (cp, I DO NOT KNOW, φp) from cp or cp ∈Dp
22: if cudelivered (cp, LOCK, φp, w) and |Mp(w,φp)| ≥ n− t then
23: send (p, ACK, φp, w) to cp // The value chosen by the coordinator is consistent with the acceptable values.
24: else
25: send (p, NACK, φp) to cp
26: else if rp(mod)4 = 0 then
27: if p = cp then
28: wait until received (q, ACK, φp, w) or (q, NACK, φp) from all processes q 6∈Dp // Coordinator waits for feedback.
29: if received at least n− t (q, ACK, φp, w) messages from distinct processes q then
30: send (p, DECIDE, w) to all processes // Sufficiently many correct processes acknowledged, and will lock w.
31: proposedp← proposedp∪{v:∃φ |Mp(v,φ)| ≥ t+1} // Update locks (done by all processes)
32: lockedp←{(φ ,w):φ ≤ φp and cudelivered((φ mod n)+1,LOCK,φ ,w) and |Mp(w,φ)| ≥ n− t}
33: if lockedp 6= /0 then
34: lockp← φ :(φ ,w) ∈ lockedp and ∀(φ ′,w′) ∈ lockedp:φ ≥ φ ′
35: acceptablep←{w}:(lockp,w) ∈ lockedp
36: else
37: acceptablep← proposedp
Task 2
38: loop
39: if cudeliver(q, INFORM, φq, acceptableq) then
40: ∀v ∈ acceptableq:Mp(v,φq)←Mp(v,φq) ∪ {(q, INFORM, φq, acceptableq)} // Bookkeeping
41: if ∃w: received (q, DECIDE, w) from t+1 distinct processes then
42: send (p, DECIDE, w) to all processes
43: if ∃w: received (q, DECIDE, w) from n− t distinct processes then
44: send (p, DECIDE, w) to all processes
45: decide(w)
46: halt // halt all tasks
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At the end of Round 4 all processes update their locks.
This is necessary due to the inconsistencies that may occur
in Round 3 due to unreliable failure detector information.
A lock can be set for a value v and a phase φ only if the
coordinator has broadcast LOCK for v and at least n− t pro-
cesses q found v acceptable at the start of the current phase,
i.e., they have sent (q, INFORM, φ , acceptableq) messages,
with v ∈ acceptableq. A correct process locks the value for
which the required messages were delivered, and the associ-
ated phase number is maximal — see line 31 to line 37. In the
proofs below, we often state that processes lock some value.
By this we mean that they execute line 34 and line 35 such
that only one value is acceptable for them, and the variable
lock is set to the phase number as described above.
Apart from maintaining the sets Mp(v,φ), Task 2 plays
a central role in the final stage of the algorithm which takes
care of deciding and halting. The mechanism used is ba-
sically echo broadcasting similar to [46]. More precisely,
when a correct process p has received at least t +1 DECIDE
messages for the same value from distinct processes, it is
certain that at least one correct process sent it and it can
forward the message to all other processes. Furthermore,
when a correct process p receives at least n−t DECIDE mes-
sages for the same value from distinct processes, it is certain
that (since n > 3t) every other correct process will even-
tually receive at least t + 1 such messages. Consequently,
all correct processes will eventually send this DECIDE mes-
sage, and thus every correct process will eventually receive
at least n− t such messages. Thus, p can decide and halt, as
all other processes will eventually also reach this point and
will decide and halt. This explains why we can halt all other
tasks (including those implementing cubcast) at this point:
no more messages from process p are required for the other
processes to reach a decision.
5.2.2 Correctness proof
The proof of correctness follows the ideas in [27] and [3].
The proof of decision, however, is more involved than that
in [27] due to the asynchrony that eventually stops in the
models of [27] but remains in our model during the whole
execution. We start by showing simple properties that follow
directly from the properties of the broadcasting primitive.
Lemma 9 It is impossible for correct processes to lock two
distinct values in a phase φ if it belongs to a correct coordi-
nator q = (φ mod n)+1.
Proof Correct processes only lock a value w when they have
added it to lockedp before in line 32, that is, when they in-
voked cudeliver for a message ((φ mod n)+1, LOCK, φ , w)
and they invoked cudeliver for (p, INFORM, φ , acceptablep)
messages broadcast by n− t distinct processes p with w in
acceptablep. From code inspection we see that correct co-
ordinators broadcast at most one LOCK message per phase.
It follows therefore from the unforgeability property of cu-
bcast that if the coordinator is correct, then only one such
LOCK message can be delivered per phase; the lemma fol-
lows. uunionsq
Lemma 10 If at least t+1 correct processes either halt be-
fore reaching phase φ+1 or have a lock on value w in phase
φ with a correct coordinator, no correct process will lock
value v = 1−w in any phase φ ′ ≥ φ .
Proof For phase φ ′ = φ the lemma is true by Lemma 9. As-
sume by contradiction that there is a phase after φ where a
correct process locks 1−w and let φ ′ > φ be the smallest of
these phases. By line 32 we must have |Mp(v,φ ′)| ≥ n− t
which is required to lock a value at any correct process p.
By our choice of φ ′, at the beginning of phase φ ′ the t + 1
processes still have a lock on w such that v 6∈ acceptable or
have already halted. Thus their messages do not show up in
Mp(v,φ ′), i.e., a distinct set of processes of cardinality n− t
must have sent messages for v. Summing up the sizes of
these sets we get (n− t)+ (t +1). As this is strictly greater
than the number of processes n, we arrive at the required
contradiction. uunionsq
Lemma 11 If some correct coordinator c sends a message
(c, DECIDE, φ , w) and no other correct process has sent a
DECIDE message in phases less than φ , then:
(1) At least t + 1 correct processes lock w with phase num-
ber φ , or halt before reaching phase φ +1.
(2) The correct processes that lock w with phase number φ
will always have a lock on w from then on.
Proof A correct coordinator requires at least n− t acknowl-
edgments to its LOCK message to send (c, DECIDE, r, w),
among which are at least t + 1 sent by correct processes
who have received the coordinator’s LOCK message; let S′
be the set of these processes. From line 41 and line 43 fol-
lows that as soon as c has sent (c, DECIDE, φ , w) to all, cor-
rect processes may decide and halt at any time (after enough
DECIDE messages have been exchanged what happens con-
currently in Task 2). To prove (1) let S be the subset of S′
of processes that do not halt before they reach phase φ +1.
Since they have sent an acknowledgment, by line 22 it fol-
lows for all p ∈ S that |Mp(w,φ)| ≥ n− t, and (1) follows
from line 32.
By Lemma 10, the processes in S′ do not lock another
value in later rounds such that line 34 and line 35 ensure that
w remains locked, which proves (2). uunionsq
Theorem 8 (Agreement) No two correct processes decide
differently.
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Proof Assume by contradiction that two correct processes
decide on different values.
From line 41 and line 43 it is evident that in order for a
correct process to decide on v at least one correct coordinator
must have sent a DECIDE message for that value (in line 30).
Thus, in order for processes to decide on different values,
there must be two correct coordinators, say p and q, which
sent in line 30 DECIDE messages for v and 1− v in phases
ψp and ψq. As each phase belongs to exactly one coordi-
nator, clearly ψp 6= ψq, so w.l.o.g. we assume that ψp < ψq.
Now, Lemma 11 tells us that there are at least t+1 processes
which have a lock on v in phase ψq, or halt before. That is,
they will cubcast (∗ , INFORM, ψq, {v}) in the first round of
phase ψq, or halt before. By the properties of cubcast, q can
therefore not receive n− t INFORM messages for 1− v, that
is, it cannot broadcast a LOCK message for that value, and
thus will not receive n− t ACK messages. Thus it will not
send a DECIDE message containing 1− v; a contradiction.
uunionsq
Theorem 9 (Validity) If a correct process decides on some
value v, then v was proposed by a correct process.
Proof By lines 31-37 it follows obviously that a value must
be in the set acceptablep of a correct process p in order to
be decided upon. Initially, only the initial value of p is in
acceptablep and only values broadcast by at least t +1 pro-
cesses, i.e., by at least one correct process, are added. uunionsq
Theorem 10 (Decision) Eventually, every correct process
decides.
Proof A correct process decides only in line 45, and thus
only if it has received n− t DECIDE messages for some w.
Since n > 3t, it follows that at least t + 1 of these originate
from correct processes, and that every correct process will
eventually receive these, causing them to send DECIDE mes-
sages for the same w. Thus, if one process decides, all cor-
rect processes will receive n− t DECIDE messages for the
same value, i.e., they will all decide. It is thus sufficient to
prove that one correct process decides.
To do so, suppose by way of contradiction that no pro-
cess decides. As a correct processes halts (line 46) only after
it has decided (line 45) no correct process ever halts.
Lemma 12 If no correct process ever halts, then for any
correct process p the phase number φp grows without bound.
Proof Assume by way of contradiction that there is a pro-
cess and a phase, such that the process remains in this round
forever. Let φ be the minimum among all phases processes
remain in forever, and let p be a process which remains in φ
forever.
Inside the loop there are only three lines where processes
wait, namely line 12, line 21, and line 28.
If p is blocked in line 12, then there is a process q which
is never suspected from which no message is delivered. As
q is never suspected, it follows from completeness that q is
correct. As by minimality of φ , no correct process is blocked
before. Process q thus reaches round 4φ +1 and eventually
cubcasts the INFORM message in line 10. By totality, p de-
livers this message eventually. A contradiction.
Therefore, no correct process is blocked in line 12 in
phase φ . With similar arguments one proves that p cannot
be blocked in line 21 and further that it cannot be blocked in
line 28 arriving at the required contradiction. uunionsq
Let time τc be the minimal time such that no messages
broadcast (or sent) by faulty processes are delivered (or re-
ceived) after τc. Let τp be the minimal time such that all
faulty processes are crashed before τp, all crashes are de-
tected and no process is suspected before it crashes; in other
words, the system is stable from time τp on. As we assume
that no correct process decides, and Lemma 12 ensures that
phase numbers increase without bound, we are sure that no
correct process has halted by time max{τp,τc}. Unambigu-
ously, we may thus define ψ to be the maximum phase a
correct process is in at time max{τp,τc}, and we define the
first stable phase φs =ψ+1. Due to the definition of the fail-
ure detector and the bounded number of faults, φs is finite in
every execution.
Lemma 13 If no correct process ever halts, and if there
exists an x such that for all correct processes p, we have
x ∈ acceptablep when they enter phase φ ≥ φs, and phase φ
belongs to a correct coordinator q = (φ mod n)+1, then q
sends (q, DECIDE, φ , w) for some w to all. Moreover, for all
phases φ ′ > φ , acceptablep = {w}.
Proof All correct processes p invoke cubcast for a message
(p, INFORM, φ , acceptablep) in line 10 and they invoke cu-
deliver for all inform messages broadcast during phase φ
in line 12 as there are no false suspicions anymore by the
choice of φs. Since there are at least n−t correct processes p
with x ∈ acceptablep, the set Vq contains at least the value x.
Thus, q invokes cubcast for a message (q, LOCK, φ , w) for
some w in line 17 (note that the coordinator need not nec-
essarily propose x to be locked here). As q is not suspected
by any correct process p, each correct p invokes cudeliver
for this message and sends the acknowledgment message in
line 23. Thus, q receives at least n− t ACK messages and
therefore sends a DECIDE message in line 30, which con-
cludes the first part of our lemma.
For the second part, we note that since all correct pro-
cesses p have sent ACK to message (q, LOCK, φ , w), they
also lock the value w for round φ , and thus by line 35 all
correct processes p set acceptablep = {w} before entering
phase φ + 1. Therefore, by the choice of φs, no other value
will ever be broadcast in round 1 in later phases and the sec-
ond part of our lemma is true. uunionsq
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Further we show that the assumption of Lemma 13 even-
tually holds. As with the beginning of phase φs the system is
stable, the failure detectors at all correct processes provide
the same correct information. By line 12 and line 21, any
message broadcast in phases beginning with φs are thus de-
livered in the phase they are broadcast. However, messages
broadcast before phase φs may be delivered at any time. Let
φt be the minimal phase such that before the first correct
process enters φt , all messages broadcast by phase φs are
delivered by all correct processes.
Lemma 14 If no correct process ever halts, there exists a
phase greater than or equal to φt such that in round 1 of
this phase, there exists some x such that for any correct pro-
cess p, the value x is in acceptablep.
Proof We distinguish two cases:
1. There is a correct process p, and a phase φ such that be-
fore phase φt , process p has delivered a ((φ mod n)+1,
LOCK, φ , ∗) message by the coordinator as well as the at
least n− t messages (∗, INFORM, φ , acceptable∗) broad-
cast by distinct processes. Let φ` be the largest phase
for which such messages where delivered and let w be
the associated value. By relay and the choice of φt all
correct processes deliver these messages before phase φt
and (φ`,w) is contained in the locked sets of all correct
processes. Therefore, by phase φt , all processes add w to
acceptable in line 35 such that all correct processes have
the value w in acceptable when entering the phase φt and
our lemma holds in this case.
2. Otherwise, that is, there is no correct process that deliv-
ers a ((φ mod n) + 1, LOCK, φ , v) message by the co-
ordinator and at least n− t messages (∗, INFORM, φ ,
acceptable∗) broadcast by distinct processes before φt . It
follows that by the choice of φt , no value is ever locked
by any correct processes for any phase before φt . As φt
is a stable phase, every correct process waits in line 12
until it has delivered INFORM message from all correct
processes. As there are at least 2t +1 correct processes,
and there are only two possible decision values, there
must be some v ∈ {0,1} such that for any correct pro-
cess p, we have |Mp(v,φt)| ≥ t+1. It follows that when
a correct process p executes line 31 in phase φt , then it
adds v to proposed. As no value has been locked before
by the assumption of this case, each correct process p
executes line 37 in phase φt , and the value v will be in
acceptable at all correct processes in the next phase. The
lemma follows in this case. uunionsq
Lemma 14 ensures that there is some phase φ ≥ φt and a
value x, such that x is in all sets acceptablep of correct pro-
cesses p when the phase φ is started. If phase φ ≥ φt belongs
to an already crashed coordinator, we easily observe (as no
more “old” messages are delivered) that at each correct pro-
cess, the value x remains in the set acceptable. However,
eventually a phase that belongs to a correct coordinator is
reached. We may thus apply Lemma 13 which ensures that a
correct coordinator q sends (q, DECIDE, ∗ , w) to all, and that
w is locked by each correct process forever. Consequently,
we may repeatedly apply Lemma 13 for every phase belong-
ing to a correct coordinator after phase φs. As there are at
least n− t > 2t + 1 correct processes that will be coordina-
tors, they will all send a DECIDE message (either in line 30,
line 42, or line 44) and eventually every correct process re-
ceives at least n−t DECIDE messages for the same value and
decides in line 45 which provides the required contradiction
and thus proves Theorem 10. uunionsq
Theorem 11 (Halting) Eventually, every correct process
reaches a terminal state.
Proof By Theorems 10, all correct processes eventually de-
cide. By simple code inspection it follows that if a correct
process decides it halts. Thus, the theorem follows. uunionsq
Corollary 3 Algorithm 2 solves consensus.
In the following section we shortly discuss that the ax-
iomatic failure detector properties can be implemented in
partially synchronous systems even in the presence of mor-
tal Byzantine faults.
5.2.3 Lower bound
To show that our algorithm has optimal resilience, it is suf-
ficient to prove that the computational model this algorithm
rests on can be implemented under partial synchrony. As a
consequence, every lower bound for partially synchronous
systems is also valid in the asynchronous model with failure
detector, and in particular the lower bound from Sect. 4.2.
The failure detector P can be implemented in the basic
round model [27] even in the presence of mortal Byzantine
faults. Correct processes send heartbeats to all in each round.
If a process p does not receive a message from some process
q in round r, then p suspects q, while if a message is received
then p does not suspect q. After round GST, all messages
from correct processes are received in the round they were
sent and thus no correct process will be suspected anymore.
Since faulty processes can only send a finite number of mes-
sages, these messages will eventually all be received. From
then on, all faulty processes will be permanently suspected.
In other words, Eventual Strong Accuracy and Strong Com-
pleteness hold.
It remains to show that the asynchronous model, or more
specifically, reliable channels, can be implemented in partial
synchrony. This is achieved in the basic round model [27]
by retransmission (via piggybacking) of every message that
was originally sent in round r in all rounds r′ > r.
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Hence, it is clear that the basic round model is stronger
(but not necessarily strictly stronger) than the asynchronous
model equipped with P such that any lower bound for the
former carries over to the latter.
6 Refined failure models
We return to the study of synchronous systems, but now con-
sider slightly different failure models. The fault models we
consider here are again inspired by the concept of hardware
monitors, which observe the behavior of processes, can de-
tect (some) faults, and are able to remove a detected faulty
process from the system. In this section we assume that this
happens within a known bounded time. We will say a fault
is potentially lethal, if it is detected by some external means
which can cause the associated process to be shut down; a
fault is non-lethal, if it cannot cause the associated process
to be removed no matter how often it occurs.
Further, we distinguish two models of how often poten-
tially lethal faults may occur before the faulty process is shut
down. One in which the faults associated to a process accu-
mulate until a given threshold is exceeded, and another one
which allows a certain number of faults within a given time
period and only removes a faulty process if it creates too
many faults too closely together, i.e., within a given time
window.
(O) Bounded Failure Occurrence. After a process has ex-
hibited potentially lethal faults in a total of x> 0 rounds,
it fails within y rounds with 0≤ y< ∞.
(R) Bounded Failure Rate. After a process has exhibited po-
tentially lethal faults within x > 0 out of z ≥ x consecu-
tive rounds, it fails within y rounds, with 0≤ y< ∞.
By choosing z = ∞ in (R), we get model (O), and so (O)
is a special case of (R). Both models allow a certain number
of faults to go unpunished and only remove a faulty pro-
cess after it exhibits “too many” faults. This allows transient
faults, e.g., memory faults, caused for example by single
event upsets, to simply run their course; the afflicted pro-
cess is only removed if it does not recover by itself within a
given number of rounds. We do not concern ourselves with
the cause of such transient faults, although in practice this
might have significant impact on the fault detection and re-
moval logic, for example in case of corrupted messages.
By choosing which faults are detectable and thus poten-
tially lethal, one derives different failure models. We first
consider the models (O) and (R) when all faults are poten-
tially lethal in Sect. 6.1. Then in Sections 6.2 we will investi-
gate how to solve consensus if only severe faulty behavior —
asymmetric faults — is potentially lethal.
Contrary to the previous sections, we need to restrict the
delivery of messages sent by a faulty process p to rounds
Algorithm 3 Fault-Tolerant Full Message Exchange
Code for processes (ft fme(vp) for process p):
Variables
1: k = x+ y+1 // number of message repetitions
2: vp // the own data to be sent
3: rcvp[n][k] // data received from i in k′-th send iteration
4: retvalp[n] // data delivered for process i, 1≤ i≤ n
5: for k′ = 1 to k do
6: send (vp) to all
7: receive
8: for all i ∈Π do
9: if received (vi) by i then
10: rcvp[i][k′]← vi
11: else
12: rcvp[i][k′]←⊥
13: for all i ∈Π do
14: if ∃w: |{k′:rcvp[i][k′] = w}|= k then
15: retvalp[i] = w
16: else
17: retvalp[i] =⊥
18: return retvalp
in which p is still alive.1 So after the hardware monitor has
removed the component (after at most y rounds), no more
messages from p may arrive at any correct process.
Based on these assumptions, we can cope with faulty
processes by repeating messages for a sufficient number of
times (i.e., by time redundancy). This allows us to devise
a simulation that makes failures appear in a more restricted
failure mode, e.g., as send omission in the following section.
Our fault-tolerant full message exchange primitive called
ft fme(v) requires k = x+ y+ 1 rounds; see Algorithm 3.
The nature of the values exchanged is not specified, it can be
single binary values, but it can also be any other data type,
e.g., a set, depending on the algorithm using the primitive.
We observe from the code that if ft fme(v) returns ⊥,
in some sense a value fault is converted to an omission. We
shall thus use the convention that if ft fme(v) returns ⊥
we say that no message (or value) has been delivered. In the
following section we will show that in fact less severe faults
can be simulated by this primitive on top of faults that obey
x, y, and z.
6.1 When all faults are potentially lethal
In this section, we will consider a system where every fault
is potentially lethal. This matches the contingency mecha-
nisms discussed in Sect. 2 (e.g., temperature monitoring or
power monitoring).
First we show that using ft fme(v) in the models (O)
or (R), a faulty process is perceived as send omission faulty,
1 This is similar to the synchronous model of computation in [39].
Contrary, in the previous section we did not have to restrict the timing
of messages from and to faulty processes.
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i.e., as if it would follow its algorithm as a correct process,
but omits to send at least one message during the execution.
Lemma 15 In the models (O) and (R), if all communication
is done via the ft fme(v) primitive, and all faults are po-
tentially lethal, then faulty processes appear omission faulty
(or crashed).
Proof Consider one instance of full message exchange, and
assume that at the end, correct processes p and q both de-
liver a value for faulty process f , i.e., retvalp[ f ] 6= ⊥ and
retvalq[ f ] 6= ⊥. Since retvali[ f ] 6= ⊥ is equivalent to equa-
tion rcvi[ f ][k′] = rcvi[ f ][k′′] for all k′,k′′ ∈ {1, ...,k}, it fol-
lows that p and q have received k = x+ y+ 1 equal values
retvalp[ f ] and retvalq[ f ], respectively, from f . However, f
can pollute at most x consecutive rounds, which may be fol-
lowed by at most y additional (possibly faulty) rounds be-
fore f crashes. Thus, during one of the k = x+y+1 rounds,
process f must have followed the algorithm and has sent cor-
rect messages to all processes. Let v f be this correct value.
Hence, there is an ` such that rcvp[ f ][`] = rcvq[ f ][`] = v f
and thus retvalp[ f ] = retvalq[ f ] = v f , so both processes p
and q deliver the same correct value v f for faulty process f .
Of course, some or all correct processes may not deliver
a value at all, for example if the faulty process commits a
send omission fault. uunionsq
From Lemma 15, we know that a faulty process may
appear at most send omission faulty. It is well known that
consensus with t send omission faults can be solved with
t+1 processes [45] in t+1 rounds, such that we obtain:
Theorem 12 If all faults are potentially lethal, consensus
with at most t faulty processes can be solved with n> t pro-
cesses.
Apart from achieving consensus with t < n faulty pro-
cesses, our fault models also allow a bounded algorithm ex-
ecution time of k · (t+1) = (x+ y+1) · (t+1) rounds.
6.2 When only asymmetric faults are potentially lethal
In certain applications, the assumption that hardware mon-
itors can detect all kinds of faults (like in the previous sec-
tions) may be overly optimistic. In particular, detecting that
the content of a message deviates from what should have
been sent if the algorithm was followed, requires knowledge
of the actual algorithm executed, and which messages are
supposed to be sent. Moreover, for instance in the case of
control systems, a message’s content may depend also on
the state of the environment. Hence, the detection of a faulty
value may be well beyond the scope of a simple monitor in
such cases. We will limit ourselves to broadcast based algo-
rithms. Here two-faced behavior might be detectable in cer-
tain systems, and no knowledge about the content of “cor-
rect” messages is required.
We will say that a process a commits an asymmetric fault
in round r if there is a correct process p that receives m
from a in round r and there is another correct process q
which either receives no message from a in round r or q re-
ceives m′ 6= m from a in round r. We will now consider (O)
if only asymmetric faults are potentially lethal.
Note carefully that processes may send erroneous values
during the whole execution, and are not required to crash
if in each round they send the same value to each correct
receiver. Such a faulty behavior we will call symmetric fault
in the following. As symmetric faults are non-lethal, a lower
bound for symmetric faults is also a lower bound for the fault
assumption of this section. As in the proof of Theorem 6 no
asymmetric behavior was required to derive the result, with
a similar proof we obtain:
Theorem 13 There is no algorithm that solves consensus in
the presence of t ≥ n/2 symmetric faulty processes.
Corollary 4 If symmetric faults are non-lethal, consensus
with at most t faulty processes requires at least n > 2t pro-
cesses.
After this lower bound, we now turn our attention to al-
gorithms. We start with the following preliminary lemma.
Lemma 16 Under (O) or (R), if all communication is done
via ft fme(v) and only asymmetric faults are potentially
lethal, then if two correct processes deliver the messages m
and m′ respectively in any round r, then m = m′.
Proof Assume that correct processes p and q both deliver
a value for a faulty process f . It follows from the code that
both p and q have received k = x+y+1 equal values. Since
asymmetric faults are potentially lethal, the same arguments
as those used in the proof of Lemma 15 imply that the re-
ceived values are the same and consequently we obtain that
retvalp[ f ] = retvalq[ f ]. uunionsq
As symmetric faults are non-lethal, the value delivered
by the correct processes may now be faulty. Again, some
correct processes may not deliver a message sent by a faulty
process at all. Conversely, it is easy to show that using the
ft fme(v) primitive, the communication between correct
processes is reliable. This behavior corresponds to the com-
munication primitive Crusader agreement defined in [22]:
Definition 5 (Crusader Agreement) Let c be a process that
sends a message to all other processes.
– All correct processes that do not explicitly know that c
is faulty agree on the same message.
– If c is correct, then all correct processes agree on the
message sent by c.
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In this context a process explicitly knows that c is faulty
if ft fme(v) returns ⊥. However, we shall show next that
asymmetric behavior on the ft fme(v)-level, requires that
the sender commits a potentially lethal fault. To this end, we
introduce the notion of an unclean message exchange: we
say faulty process p causes an unclean message exchange,
if a correct process receives a message from p while another
one does not receive a message. If this is not the case, the
message exchange is clean. Considering ft fme(v), each
time a faulty process p causes an unclean message exchange,
p commits a potentially lethal fault.
6.2.1 Bounded failure occurrence
Under model (O), each time a potentially lethal fault is com-
mitted counts towards the x bound. It follows that eventu-
ally there are no more asymmetric faults, and that eventually
all correct processes will receive the same messages in the
same round. That is eventually all message exchanges will
be clean. We will use this “eventually consistent” property
in Algorithm 4.
Lemma 17 In model (O), if a process causes x unclean mes-
sage exchanges, it will appear crashed in all subsequent full
message exchanges.
Proof From Lemma 16 we know that an asymmetric faulty
process f can at worst make one correct process p deliver a
message m for round r while another correct process q de-
livers no message at all for r. To achieve this asymmetric
delivery, at least one of the k messages sent via ft fme()
must have been due to a potentially lethal fault, thus f has
to commit at least one potentially lethal fault in round r and
hence will fail within y rounds after the x-th such fault. Since
our fault-tolerant full message exchange requires x+ y+ 1
rounds, if the x-th potentially lethal fault was at the end of
full message exchange `, then process f will send at most y
messages in full message exchange `+ 1. As the receivers
only receive at most y of the x+ y+ 1 expected messages,
none of the correct processes will deliver a value, and f will
appear crashed in this full message exchange and all subse-
quent ones. uunionsq
Our approach to solve consensus is thus to divide com-
putations in macro rounds, where in each macro round each
correct process initiates a ft fme(v). As a consequence of
Lemmas 16 and 17, in order to solve consensus in model
(O) it is sufficient to provide a consensus algorithm for the
following failure model:
– there are at most t < n/2 faulty processes,
– processes communicate through a Crusader Agreement
primitive, and
Algorithm 4 Synchronous Consensus under model (O) and
non-lethal symmetric faults
Code for processes (for process p):
Variables
1: vp ∈ {0,1} // current value (initially the proposed value)
2: rp← 0 // current round
3: rcvpropp[n] ∈ {0,1,⊥} // value received from i, 1≤ i≤ n
4: prune() // a function mapping all values
// not in {0,1} to ⊥, 0 to 0, and 1 to 1.
5: repeat
6: rp← rp +1
7: rcvpropp← prune(ft fme(vp))
8: if |{i:rcvpropp[i] = 0}| ≥ |{i:rcvpropp[i] = 1}| then
9: vp = 0
10: else
11: vp = 1
12: until rp = x · t+1
13: decide vp
14: halt
– during an interval of x+1 (macro) rounds of the consen-
sus algorithm, faulty processes are perceived symmetri-
cally2 in at least one round.
In this model, we shall prove that Algorithm 4 achieves
consensus with t < n/2 faulty processes. The key idea of the
algorithm is to calculate a new propose value in each round
from the values received from all processes. This is done
sufficiently many times so that there is at least one round
in which all message exchanges are clean. In this round, all
correct processes will calculate the same value, which will
henceforth prevail in all remaining rounds. To this end, a
correct process p repeatedly sends its own value and collects
the values from all processes in set rcvpropp. Process p then
sets its new proposed value vp either to the majority value in
rcvpropp, if it exists, or to 1 otherwise. After x · t + 1 such
iterations, the last calculated proposed value vp is used as
the decision value.
In the following we will prove that Algorithm 4 solves
consensus in the presence of up to t < n/2 faulty processes.
Theorem 14 (Decision & Halting) Every correct process
decides and halts after algorithm round x · t+1.
Proof This theorem follows from simple code inspection:
After round x · t+1, the algorithm halts, and the value of vp
after this round is the decision value. uunionsq
Theorem 15 (Validity) If some correct process decides v,
then v is proposed by some correct process.
Proof Since we are only considering binary consensus and
lines 8-11 clearly ensure that only 0 or 1 can be decided,
it suffices to show that when all processes have the same
initial value v, then v will be decided. Since processes are
2 That is, either all correct processes receive the same message or
no message of the faulty sender is received by any correct process.
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guaranteed to receive at least n− t values from correct pro-
cesses and n− t > t, we know that |{i : rcvpropp[i] = v}| >
|{i : rcvpropp[i] = 1− v}| holds in all rounds. Therefore,
the check in line 8 will always prefer the correct processes’
value. uunionsq
Theorem 16 (Agreement) No two correct processes decide
differently.
Proof It follows from Lemma 17, that a faulty process can
appear asymmetric faulty in up to x rounds before it crashes.
Therefore, as there are at most t faulty processes, correct
processes can receive inconsistent information in at most x ·t
rounds. Thus, at least one of the x · t + 1 rounds is a clean
round. In a clean round, all correct processes have the same
set rcvpropp[i] and will therefore compute the same value,
which will henceforth win the majority in every subsequent
round and thus will be delivered as the decision value. uunionsq
Corollary 5 Algorithm 4 solves consensus under (O).
6.2.2 Bounded failure rate
In the previous section, we discussed a consensus algorithm
which is based on the assumption that processes communi-
cate via Crusader agreement and that faulty processes can be
perceived asymmetrically at most for x rounds before they
crash. Since in the failure model with bounded failure rate
(R), asymmetric behavior leads only to a crash if it hap-
pens at a too high density, we know from Lemma 16 that
in this section we have to deal with permanent faults, while
communication can still be done using Crusader agreement.
Consensus actually can be solved under these assumptions
with a majority of correct processes: The argument uses re-
sults by Fitzi and Maurer [33]. They have shown that con-
sensus can be solved based on a special kind of multi-cast
primitive called two-cast channels:
Definition 6 (two-cast channels) Among any triple of pro-
cesses and for any process among them, there exists a broad-
cast channel to the remaining two processes.
Fitzi and Maurer then use this communication primitive to
extend their result to primitives with other consistency guar-
antees, one of which they call weak broadcast [33, Defini-
tion 4]. As weak broadcast basically is just a reformulation
of Crusader agreement, and can thus be implemented with
any number of processes under our fault assumption, we ob-
tain that consensus is solvable with a minority of faulty pro-
cesses under model (R).
6.3 Discussion
Table 1 summarizes this section’s results with respect to re-
silience for systems with known lifespan of faults. The table
contains pointers to the results in literature which we have
shown to apply to our failure models.
System all potentially lethal only asym. potentially lethal
(O) t+1 [45] 2t+1 (Alg. 4)
(R) t+1 [45] 2t+1 [33]
Table 1 Resilience of consensus in different systems
Clearly, systems benefit from a perfect hardware moni-
tor that can detect all faults, as in this case n > t processes
are sufficient, at the cost of increased message complexity.
If symmetric faults cannot be detected, though, the n > 2t
bound of Sect. 4 cannot be improved. Still, even though the
bound remains the same, the coverage of systems may be
improved: transient failures, which cause the algorithm of
Sect. 4 to fail, can now be handled as long as they only oc-
cur in moderation.
Our solutions for consensus use the ft fme(v) primi-
tive to implement macro rounds in which some of the faulty
behaviors are masked. In this way, we can solve consen-
sus with simple algorithms based on these macro rounds.
A drawback of this approach is that our solutions are quite
inefficient with respect to the number of rounds. Whether
more efficient algorithms can be found is subject to future
work.
The assumptions of certain faults which are non-lethal
is not easily comparable to the mortal Byzantine model of
Sect. 4.2. On the one hand, faulty processes may be alive
forever, given that they do not behave two-faced. On the
other hand, after behaving two-faced (too often), a faulty
process must crash within a fixed number of rounds, while
in Sect. 4.2, a faulty processes was required to crash only
eventually.
7 Related Work
The seminal work by Pease, Shostak, and Lamport [38,44]
considers consensus (or more precisely the closely related
Byzantine Generals problem) for synchronous systems with
arbitrary faulty processes. This combines, on the one hand,
highly optimistic [39, page 5] timing assumptions with, on
the other hand, highly pessimistic fault assumptions to re-
sult in the well-known n > 3t bound. Naturally, researchers
turned to investigating other timing assumptions and fault
types. Relaxing the synchronous system assumption led to
the well-known impossibility result by Fischer, Lynch, and
Paterson [32] for asynchronous systems and subsequently to
work on weak synchrony assumptions as the seminal paper
by Dwork, Lynch and Stockmeyer [27] and subsequent work
as [3,11,17]. Another approach was to augment the asyn-
chronous system with failure detectors [24,25,40]. Other
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approaches aim at optimizing normal case behavior [1,18,
41] or consider more elaborate fault models in an effort to
improve fault resilience as, for instance, Byzantine faults
with recovery [4,5] or hybrid failure models [6,9,47].
Our results can be roughly divided into two domains,
namely, synchronous and non-synchronous systems. In the
case of synchronous systems, our approach aims at improv-
ing resilience by strengthening the fault assumptions. In the
other case, we explore in which cases something can be
gained from the failure model. We show that in partially
synchronous models nothing is gained compared to Byzan-
tine faults. In the asynchronous case we showed that unre-
liable failure detectors [13] — which were originally intro-
duced for crash failures only — can in fact be used to toler-
ate non-benign faults as well, if the faulty processes eventu-
ally crash. In contrast to most previous work in this area, we
consider failure mode trajectories, where components mi-
grate from one (severe) fault type to another (less severe)
one, since such models are not just of purely theoretical in-
terest, but also of practical use, as illustrated in the examples
from Sect. 2.
In this paper we considered a variant of consensus that
is required to halt. As laid out in [15], in general, results
on deciding not necessarily carry over to halting, i.e., reach-
ing a terminal state in which no further messages are sent;
cf. [23,39]. In our context, the distinction is interesting, as
we have shown in Sect. 4.2 that if there is just a majority
(i.e., 2t < n ≤ 3t) of correct processes, there is no fixed
number of rounds (in the synchronous model) that an al-
gorithm requires to decide in each execution. However, we
showed that our algorithms — including the asynchronous
one in particular — solve the problem of reaching a termi-
nal state as well. This is an interesting property of our algo-
rithms, which is of practical interest in long running systems
where it is advantageous to be able to free the resources of
halted processes.
7.1 Synchronous Systems
Our Algorithm 1 has some similarities to the EDAC algo-
rithm described in [15] and originally introduced in [29].
EDAC solves the early deciding consensus problem in the
presence of crash faults.
We have seen that the number of required processes for
synchronous consensus can be reduced to n ≥ 2t + 1, but
at the cost that the required decision time (more precisely
the number of rounds) cannot be bounded. Due to the latter
result, it might appear as if this model cannot be employed if
bounded decision time is required. However, following the
late binding principle [35] this is only true when the life time
of faults (e.g., the delay of the detection mechanism) in the
real system is not bounded. As our proofs reveal, if over all
executions the time in which faulty processes can pollute the
system is bounded, so is the decision time.
7.2 Asynchronous system with a failure detector
For crash faults, Chandra and Toueg [13] showed that con-
sensus can be solved in an asynchronous system, if it is en-
riched with an oracle that provides processes in each step
with a set of processes that the oracle assumes to be faulty.
In order for this information to be useful to the asynchronous
algorithm, from some time on, the oracle has to provide re-
liable information forever [12,14]. Chandra and Toueg also
showed that such oracles can be implemented in a general-
ization of the partially synchronous systems of [27].
Later, Doudou et al. [25,26] observed that the failure de-
tector approach cannot be extended seamlessly to Byzantine
faults. Instead, they proposed “gray-box” modules, which
they called muteness detectors, that allow to solve consen-
sus in the presence of Byzantine faults. Gray-box means that
information flow is not one-way anymore, as is the case with
the Chandra and Toueg solution of consensus where the fail-
ure detector outputs the suspicions but takes no input from
the consensus algorithm. Rather, gray-box means that the
consensus algorithm itself has to provide the failure detector
with information on faults (which is impossible for the FD
to get without knowledge of the consensus algorithm’s inter-
nals). Doudou et al. observe that this circularity is inherent to
the problem. In the solution they provide, the correctness of
both the failure detector and the consensus algorithm depend
on the synchrony assumptions of the partially synchronous
model.
Most of the existing work on asynchronous failure detec-
tor based Byzantine consensus [7,25,26,34,36,37,40] tries
to strengthen the system in more than one way. The solution
of Doudou et al. adds synchrony assumptions at consensus
level as well as bidirectional communication between the
consensus and the failure detector module, and so do Fried-
man et al. [34] who refer to the solution of Doudou et al.
[26]. Kihlstrom et al. [37] enrich the system with authentica-
tion. Additionally, the failure detector implementation they
provide requires the special consensus algorithm proposed
in their paper as they observe certain consensus messages;
it is assumed that the consensus algorithm is round based.
(This is another example of the circular dependency Doudou
et al. show to be problem inherent.) Malkhi et al. [40] define
quiet processes via behaviors of processes given a certain
broadcast primitive that is implementable in asynchronous
systems. Implementing the failure detector they define, how-
ever, requires synchrony assumptions (partial synchrony) on
at least a subset of consensus messages (which may be given
in practical applications). None of the discussed consensus
algorithms is purely asynchronous.
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Our approach is different from the ones that can be found
in the mentioned literature: We investigate failure detector
based consensus under a stronger fault model, namely the
mortal Byzantine model. For this we show that this failure
assumption allows to tolerate faults in a modular manner,
i.e., the failure detector implementation requires no knowl-
edge on the internals of the consensus algorithm. Moreover,
in sharp contrast to the consensus algorithms that were dis-
cussed above, our algorithm is purely asynchronous, i.e.,
there are no synchrony assumptions on consensus messages
and the relative execution speed of the processor running the
consensus algorithm. These nice properties, however, can of
course only be achieved due to our fault semantics being
stronger than in the presented related work. We assume that
Byzantine processes have to crash eventually, i.e., they only
take a finite number of steps. This eliminates the aforemen-
tioned circularity.
From a different, perhaps more practical viewpoint, the
mortal Byzantine model can be interpreted as a system with
Byzantine faults where some (external) part of the system
can reliably detect faults and can guarantee that faulty nodes
will eventually be silenced or crashed. This latter assump-
tion is the central difference to the failure detector based
approaches to tolerate classic Byzantine faults we have dis-
cussed above. If this has to be implement within the sys-
tem, our approach only provides a different kind of layering,
which allows an asynchronous consensus algorithm.
There are several attempts to extend the failure detec-
tor approach to other fault models, weaker than crash. Most
notable Aguilera et al. [2] and Delporte-Gallet et al. [19]
consider benign faults, that is, faults that do not lead to cor-
rupted states or messages. Aguilera et al. studied failure de-
tector based consensus in the presence of crashes with re-
covery. They classified processes into eventually up, even-
tually down, and unstable processes. Their approach was
to find failure detector definitions that are suitable for the
crash-recovery failure model; definitions that turned out to
be rather intricate. Delporte-Gallet et al. gave general trans-
formations for problem specifications, failure detectors, and
algorithms. Hence, they show that crash-tolerant algorithms
can be transformed such that they solve transformed prob-
lems using transformed failure detectors. Whether such a
general transformation is also possible for mortal Byzantine
faults is an interesting open question and subject to future
work.
The approaches of Aguilera et al. [2] and Delporte-Gallet
et al. [19] generalize the liveness aspect of the faulty pro-
cesses that are originally [13] considered crash faulty only.
These approaches deal with failure models that do not en-
sure that faulty processes terminate as a crash. In our work
on asynchronous systems with failure detectors, we still re-
quire that processes crash, and our liveness properties are
therefore simpler than those in [2] and [19]. However, we
focused on “value faults” that can be seen as generalizations
of the safety aspect of process behavior.
7.3 Mortal Byzantine faults
Bazzi and Herlihy [8] have generalized our results [49] in
the synchronous case for hybrid failure models, namely for
systems where processes can exhibit both mortal Byzantine
and classic Byzantine faults. One could consider that this
models systems where only some of the Byzantine failures
are detected even if they are perpetually faulty and not just
for a few steps as in our models of Sect. 6. In more detail, as-
suming m faulty processes are mortal and i faulty processes
are classic (immortal) Byzantine in a system of n processes,
they show that consensus is solvable in synchronous systems
if and only if n > 3i+ 2m. More precisely, they give an al-
gorithm for binary consensus that works with n > 3i+ 2m,
and they show that the Byzantine Generals problem [38]
cannot be solved with n = 3i+ 2m. By setting i = 0, one
observes that in the more general hybrid setting they ex-
tend our results regarding consensus solvability. For par-
tially synchronous or asynchronous systems, however, our
lower bound result from Sect. 5.1 suggests that using such a
hybrid approach will not lead to consensus algorithms with
improved resiliency.
Bazzi and Herlihy [8] also investigated the problem of
broadcasting in the mortal Byzantine failure model (in the
absence of classic Byzantine faults). They discussed that
if all Byzantine processes are eventually detected one can
solve a weak form of terminating reliable broadcast if n>m.
In this weak form, processes are only required to deliver
the broadcaster’s value if all faulty processes have crashed
before the broadcast was initiated. Further they introduced
a pipelining mechanism, in which by repeatedly using this
weak broadcasting protocol, one can solve terminating reli-
able broadcast (TRB), that is, the Byzantine Generals prob-
lem [38], without any requirement on the number of mortal
Byzantine failures.
For classic Byzantine failures, the TRB and consensus
problems are usually considered to be equivalent, thus their
result seems to conflict with our 2t + 1 lower bound on the
number of processes. In fact it does not, as these two results
together give a very precise characterization on which safety
properties is harder to maintain in presence of mortal Byzan-
tine failures: recall that we only used the validity property of
consensus in the proof of Theorem 6; a property that requires
that in case all correct processes initially agree, their value
is the only legal decision value. It is in some sense evident
that this property requires a majority of correct processes. In
contrast, the validity property of TRB only requires a pro-
cess to decide on the value sent by one process (or to deliver
no value, in the case of a faulty broadcaster).
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It is also worth mentioning, that this result shows that
consensus is harder than TRB with respect to resilience to
mortal Byzantine failures. As is observed in [13], the oppo-
site is true with respect to failure detectors (in the presence
of benign failures).
Nesterenko and Arora study malicious crashes [43]. The
assumptions on malicious crashes are basically the same as
for mortal Byzantine failures. However, their work is in a
different context. On the one hand, they consider shared reg-
isters as communication medium which contrasts our mes-
sage passing models. On the other hand, they study a dif-
ferent problem, namely, dining philosophers. Their solution
uses techniques from self-stabilization to ensure that the sys-
tem is able to recover or at least contain the disorder caused
by the malicious behavior and eventual crash of faulty pro-
cesses. The maximal distance from a faulty process to a pro-
cess that is affected by the fault is called the failure locality.
Clearly, ensuring total recovery of the system after all (mor-
tal Byzantine) faulty processes have crashed would amount
to guaranteeing failure locality 0, which is impossible to
achieve in asynchronous systems as the minimal failure lo-
cality of any dining philosophers algorithm is known to be 2
[16].
Similarly, [50] studies self-stabilizing leader election in
rings in the presence of mortal Byzantine failures. In their
solution the failure locality depends on the number of arbi-
trary state changes a process may perform.
8 Discussions
We studied a fault model that seems to accurately describe
faulty behavior as experienced in certain practical applica-
tions. Our motivating examples were from the space domain,
but our fault model may also be used to describe human-
managed systems, where upon observing a deviation from
normal behavior by some computer, the operator shuts it
down. The model lies between crash model and Byzantine
model as faulty processes are allowed to behave Byzantine
until they eventually crash.
The notion of failure mode trajectory seems to be an
interesting issue for future work. We considered only the
extreme case where faulty processes may start to exhibit
the most general failure mode (Byzantine) and eventually
converge to a very benign fault, i.e., they crash. In the syn-
chronous case, we showed that n > 2t is necessary and suf-
ficient to solve consensus, and it is thus possible to toler-
ate more faults than in the (classic) Byzantine case. In gen-
eral, it should be possible to devise more efficient solutions
(e.g., regarding synchrony assumptions or required number
of processes) by replacing a static fault model with a model
where the behavior of faulty processes converges towards
some benign fault.
When considering failure mode trajectories, algorithms
typically have to be safe in the presence of the most severe
failure mode within the trajectory. Our synchronous algo-
rithm and our asynchronous algorithm are safe even in the
presence of (classic) Byzantine faults. In order to guarantee
decision, processes have to crash, however.
In the synchronous case, we also considered more re-
fined models where processes may exhibit a bounded num-
ber of faults without ever crashing, but if they do exceed this
bound, they crash within a known number of rounds. These
models allow to deal with certain transient faults.
In this paper we considered only binary consensus, that
is, the set of possible decision values is {0,1}. For the lower
bounds in this paper, this is a safe choice as considering
binary consensus gives stronger results than in the multi-
valued case.
Considering upper bounds, our asynchronous algorithm
can easily be adapted to solve multi-valued consensus by
changing the way the proper set is handled similar to [27].
There are also general techniques to extend algorithms for
binary consensus to solve the multi-valued version of the
problem. Most notably, for the Byzantine case there is the
synchronous algorithm by Turpin and Coan [48], which re-
quires n > 3t. As we only have n > 2t in the synchronous
case, the results by Turpin and Coan do not directly imply
that our binary consensus algorithms also provide an upper
bound result for multi-valued consensus. However, the fol-
lowing simple arguments close this gap.
As mentioned in Section 3, an alternative to our Valid-
ity condition that is also suitable for multi-valued consensus
would be to require “if all correct processes propose v, and
a correct process decides w, then v = w.” We will now ex-
plain how to achieve consensus with this Validity property
when v can be from a some set V with |V |> 2, based on our
algorithms. Processes start one instance of binary consen-
sus for each v ∈ V , and use 1 as initial value if v is their
initial value, otherwise they use 0 for the instance corre-
sponding to v. After a correct process has decided in all |V |
instances, it decides on the minimal v such that the binary
consensus instance corresponding to v decided on 1, or some
default value if all instances decided on 0. Agreement, Deci-
sion and Halting of this simple protocol follow directly from
the corresponding properties of the binary protocol. More-
over, when all processes propose v then all correct processes
propose 1 for the instance corresponding to v, and 0 in all
other instances. According to the Validity property, our al-
gorithms guarantee the decision value of each instance is the
initial value of some correct process for that instance. Con-
sequently, the processes decide on 1 for the instance cor-
responding to v, and 0 for all other instances. Clearly the
decision value of our reduction will be v, thus satisfying the
Validity property given above.
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This simple reduction needs |V | instances when the ini-
tial values are taken from the set V . An alternative approach
would be to instead reach agreement over every bit of the ini-
tial values, thus reducing the number of instances to log |V |.
Similar bit-per-bit approaches that work only for benign fail-
ures are used in the reduction algorithms in [42,51].
Authentication can be used “in practice” to reduce the
required number of processes [38]. In this paper, we have
chosen not to consider authenticated algorithms, because in
addition to the lack of a formal definition of authentication
in the presence of Byzantine faults, and the disadvantage of
computational and communication overhead, there is also
the possibility that authentication can be broken.
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